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Abstract
Recent philosophical work on the concept of human nature disagrees on how to respond to the
Darwinian challenge, according to which biological species do not have traditional essences. Three
broad kinds of reactions can be distinguished: (1) conservative intrinsic essentialism, which defends
essences in the traditional sense, (2) eliminativism, which suggests dropping the concept of human
nature altogether, and (3) constructive approaches, which argue that revisions can generate sensible
concepts of human nature beyond traditional essences. The different constructive approaches pick out
one or two of the three epistemic roles that are fused in traditional essentialist conceptions of human
nature: descriptive (descriptivism), explanatory (explanativism), deﬁnitional (taxonomic relationalism), or
explanatory and deﬁnitional (property cluster essentialism). These turns towards diverging epistemic roles
are best interpreted pluralistically: there is a plurality of concepts of human nature that have to be clearly
distinguished, each with a legitimate role in respective scientiﬁc contexts.
1. Two Dimensions
Talk of human nature traditionally picks out intricate theoretical and also deep practical
philosophical issues. It is the boundaries towards animals on the one side and machines or
superhuman creatures like gods on the other side that historically created the space of under-
standing important for the concept of human nature. Talk of ‘human nature’ thus marks a
self-understanding that is anchored by our deepest fears (bestiality) and hopes (salvation), in part
even within science, as Proctor (2003) indicates for questions about the origin of humans.
With respect to theoretical issues, the use of the term ﬁrst and foremost raises concerns about
the validity of references to essences, i.e., natures of kinds such as humans. Since essences have
become precarious categories in contemporary philosophy of science, some have suggested that
the concept of human nature should be eliminated. It does not, they argue, respect the variabil-
ity of life, which makes each individual truly unique. Others try to defend a concept of human
nature nonetheless.
In practical (in particular, in existential, moral, and political) terms, reference to human nature
involves questions about identity, hopes, and fears (what humans are, how humans should live,
and what humans can and should hope for), since facts about our constitution are relevant for
our destiny and values. This dimension is at the fore in current claims that ‘human nature’
can be revived as a normative standard, notably in neo-Aristotelian meta-ethics, where the term
is used to pick out ‘human f lourishing’ (Hursthouse 1999, Foot 2001), and in applied ethical
contexts, for instance as a constraint on permissible enhancement (Buchanan 2011).
Whereas essentialism in scientiﬁc contexts has been challenged as being incompatible with
contemporary knowledge in biology, normative essentialism has been criticized for its tendency
to lead to forms of social exclusion by implicitly or explicitly stigmatizing members of
out-groups or subgroups as deﬁcient or sub-human (see, for instance, Hull 1986, Haste© 2014 The Author(s)
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norance of ‘alternative ontologies’ that don’t restrict ascriptions of humankind and personhood
to humans (see Descola 2005, Sahlins 2008, Lloyd 2012).
In this article, we want to clear a path through the ﬁrst, theoretical dimension of questions
regarding human nature, currently hotly debated within philosophy of science. At the center
of that dimension is the question in which sense a concept of human nature can or should
assume an essence of the human kind (for other issues, see Roughley (ed.) 2000, Inglis et al.
(eds.) 2005, Sandis and Cain (eds.) 2012, Downes and Machery (eds.) 2013).
2. The Darwinian Challenge
Historically, talk of a species’ nature, whether the nature of humans or of any other species, has
generally picked out an essence with two epistemic roles, namely a deﬁnitional and an
explanatory one. A number of authors, primarily Ernst Mayr (1963), David Hull (1978,
1986), and Elliott Sober (1980), inf luentially debunked such essentialism for biological
species. As a result, essentialist specieshood concepts of human nature have had a rather bad press
within philosophy of science.
What would an essence amount to in that context? Sober (1980: 354) phrased it in the fol-
lowing way: ‘The essentialist hypothesizes that there exists some characteristic unique to and
shared by all members of Homo sapiens which explains why they are the way they are.’ (Sober
1980: 354) If something is unique, i.e., speciﬁc to members of a kind, this characteristic is sufﬁcient
for species membership, but it is not necessary. You can be human without it, but since only
humans will have it, if you do have it, you are ‘in’. If something is, however, shared by all
members of a kind, this characteristic is necessary for an individual to be a member of that kind.
Otherwise, not all humans would have it. If you don’t exhibit it, you’re not ‘in’. Since necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions are traditionally held to provide the deﬁnition of a kind of thing, an
essence plays a deﬁnitional role for the respective kind. Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
species membership can thus be said to be the deﬁnitional essence of a kind. If the respective
deﬁnitional characteristics are simultaneously explanatory for the life form of that kind (i.e., ‘the
way the members are’), then the deﬁnitional essence is also explanatory. Traditionally, the
relevant explanatory characteristics were also considered to be intrinsic, rather than relational
properties of the individuals whose essence is at issue.
Since the language of ‘essence’ traditionally refers to (a) intrinsic properties that are (b)
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, we take it that characteristics that don’t satisfy both these
roles should not be regarded as essential in the traditional sense. This excludes both extrinsic
features and characteristics that would qualify as explanatory for a life form without being
deﬁnitional (in the sense of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions). We shall see in
Sections 6 and 7 that there are more liberal ways of using the term ‘essence’.
If the essentialist was right, biological species would qualify as so-called natural kinds,
i.e., kinds that have a deﬁnitional and simultaneously explanatory essence. But they are not natural
kinds, or so the anti-essentialists argue. Ever since natural kinds became a topic in 20th century
philosophy, chemical elements have been regarded as paradigmatic examples. First, chemical
kinds are spatio-temporally unrestricted sets. Second, there is an essence for each kind, namely
the atomic number, that deﬁnes the kind (i.e., allows delineation from other kinds and decides
kind membership). Third, that essence explains, at least in part, properties of the kind members
and consists of properties intrinsic to the members of the kind. Biological kinds are different in
each of these three respects.
First, a biological species in the evolutionary sense is spatiotemporally restricted by historical,
i.e., genealogical relationships at the level of the members as well as at the level of the species.
Members of a species entertain a genealogical relationship with each other. This assumption is© 2014 The Author(s)
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what else these species concepts might assume. Furthermore, the different biological species
are part of a genealogical branching structure, often depicted as a tree. Members of chemical
kinds, by contrast, need not be genealogically related to be members of the same kind, and
the kinds themselves form a periodic table rather than a genealogical system. A gold token, for
instance, does not have to be descended from another token of gold to be gold, and gold as a type
is not genealogically descended from any of the other chemical elements the way species are.
Second, because of the variability of life, there are no necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
being a member (or part) of a biological species. Each individual is different. Some individuals
may be missing one characteristic typical of the kind (e.g., the capacity to walk upright), others
a different characteristic (e.g., language), despite them all belonging to the same kind. The kind’s
cohesion is created by genealogy (and other evolutionary mechanisms, see below), rather than
by similarity. Variability entails that a defensible biological account of characteristics of a kind is
statistical through and through, right down to the genetic level. This latter point holds since
there is not even a single gene that is strictly shared by all and only the members of a particular
species, as Okasha (2002: 196–7) stressed. Therefore, Darwinian kind thinking with respect to
species is populational (oriented towards statistical features of a population) rather than typolog-
ical (oriented towards types, individuals strictly instantiating the essence).
Third, such a populational account entails that there is no basis and no need for a reduc-
tion of apparent variation to a hidden intrinsic essence (analogous to the micro-structure of
chemical kinds and exhibited by all and only the individuals of the kind). Examples of such
hidden essences would be (i) a disposition for a speciﬁc range of human body height that
explains body height variation or (ii) the capacity for human spoken language that makes
everybody equal in terms of that fundamental feature even though not all humans exhibit
that feature.
It is thus the quintessential variability within each genealogically bounded kind that marks
biological kinds off from paradigmatic natural kinds (such as chemical kinds) with their intrinsic
deﬁnitional as well as explanatory essences that are shared by literally all members of the kind.
Taken together, these points have cemented a consensus in philosophy of science that an
essentialist concept of a human nature (or of any species’ nature) is incompatible with contempo-
rary biological knowledge regarding evolution, heredity, and development.
3. Three Kinds of Reactions
There have been three kinds of reactions to this consensus in recent literature. One type
of reaction challenges the consensus by marshaling new arguments for intrinsic essences
of biological species, a second proposes abandoning the concept altogether, and a third
attempts to construct a replacement concept of human nature that is compatible with
the consensus. Our focus will be on variants of the third type of reaction. We begin,
however, with a few words on the ﬁrst and the second, explaining why we think, ﬁrst,
that conservative intrinsic neo-essentialism cannot work and, second, that eliminativism
is unnecessarily defeatist.
3.1. CONSERVATIVE INTRINSIC ESSENTIALISM
Devitt (2008) and Boulter (2012) claim that there have to be hidden essences, i.e., developmen-
tal resources that are both shared by individuals and intrinsic to each individual, resources,
moreover, that are deﬁnitional as well as explanatory and thus essences in the traditional sense.
These authors are probably best interpreted as employing an inference to the best explanation:
how else to explain the overt similarity between individuals, if not by an essence in the
traditional sense? The Darwinian populationist thinker answers ‘By genealogy that creates a© 2014 The Author(s)
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There is no good reason why an explanation invoking essences should be regarded as the best
available given the availability of a Darwinian explanation.
Dumsday (2012) adopts a different strategy, arguing for a classiﬁcation of biological kinds
based on the concept of organisms rather than on the concept of species, as the former allows
for intrinsic essences independent of the Darwinian challenge. According to Dumsday, an
entity is an organism, rather than a non-living entity, because of intrinsic features, namely
internal relations of the organism’s parts to each other. Therefore, the argument goes, each
kind of organism’s essence must be (in part at least) intrinsic. The problem with this defense
of an intrinsic essence is that the term ‘human nature’ (or a term picking out any species
nature) traditionally refers to biological kinds not as organisms but as species, i.e., to
evolutionary units. As such evolutionary units, biological kinds do not have intrinsic
essences whose instantiation by individuals is necessary and sufﬁcient for membership. This
follows from the fact that species are biologically deﬁned by genealogical relations between
their individual members.
3.2. ELIMINATIVISM
A genuine option for those who take the Darwinian picture seriously is the abandonment of any
scientiﬁc use of the expression ‘human nature’, given its essentialist heritage and given the
Darwinian challenge to that heritage. This eliminativist proposal, advanced by Hull, has indeed
been taken up by a series of authors (e.g., De Sousa 2000, Dupré 2003, 2011, Lewens 2012,
Downes forthcoming). The use of the term has, some even claim, done considerable harm in
the social realm by excluding or discriminating against human beings with untypical traits,
who are then categorized as ‘less human’. Moreover, the sciences do not need any concept of
human nature. Here, philosophy of science and cultural studies, particularly gender and disabil-
ity studies, join forces against all forms of essentialism (see Antony 1998 and Silvers 1998 on the
latter areas’ critical stance towards essentialism regarding humans).
Yet, it seems that some research issues in the human sciences (e.g., anthropology,
psychology, economy, sociology, and also history) must presuppose the possibility of
generalizations, some of which are explanatory, ranging over all humans. It should be
a criterion for success of a philosophical theory of human nature that it makes sense
of general references to humans in the human sciences. Furthermore, eliminativism is
unnecessary if it can be shown that there are benign replacements for a traditional essen-
tialist concept of human nature.
3.3. CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES
The most interesting reactions to the Darwinian challenge propose newly conﬁgured concepts
of human nature that are explicitly taken to be defensible in light of the need to move beyond
traditional essences. These reconﬁgurations are the result of an epistemic turn in the debate. As
so often in philosophy, progress is made by showing that different things have been lumped
together under one term (‘human nature’) because the epistemic roles of the things or features
referred to by that term (e.g., whether these are meant to be deﬁnitional or explanatory or both)
have not been sufﬁciently distinguished.
The constructive positions held in the recent literature attribute different epistemic roles to
the concept of human nature: descriptive (descriptivism), explanatory (explanativism), taxo-
nomic (taxonomic relationalism), or a new combination of explanatory and deﬁnitional roles
(property cluster essentialism). After illustrating these, we conclude in the ﬁnal section that this
reassignment of epistemic roles is indicative of a legitimate pluralism of successor concepts to that
of traditional ‘human nature’, concepts that are appropriate in different scientiﬁc contexts.© 2014 The Author(s)
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One possibility left unchallenged within the Darwinian framework is a concept of
human nature with a merely descriptive role, i.e., one that simply picks out the charac-
teristic features of the human life form that traditional essences had been supposed to
explain. These would simply be properties instantiated by a statistically signiﬁcant
number of humans, properties whose alteration would have marked effects on the overall
behavioral proﬁle of humankind.
Machery (2008), for instance, speciﬁes a ‘nomological concept’ of human nature as referring
to those traits (e.g., human language) that are species-typical and evolved. According to him,
these characteristics need not be species-speciﬁc, since such a requirement would be asking
for a deﬁnitional taxonomic role again, i.e., one which would demarcate us from other animals.
The resulting nomological concept is ﬁrst and foremost meant to be descriptive: it refers to
generalizations about humans described by sciences such as anatomy, physiology, ethology,
and especially cognitive-behavioral research, e.g., psychology. In a recent proposal, Ramsey
(2013) focuses particularly on human life history traits, whether they have evolved or are due
to social learning, e.g., vulnerability to certain diseases or psychological dispositions. He deﬁnes
human nature as ‘the pattern of trait clusters within the totality of extant human possible life
histories’ (Ramsey 2013: 4). This trait cluster is a statistical distribution and may change during
the existence of the human species. It is thus not meant to have a deﬁnitional role with respect to
species membership. Some of the remarks of Dupré, Lewens, and Downes can equally be
interpreted as going in this more constructive rather than eliminative direction. For a
descriptivist position, the search for human nature simply is, as John Dupré put it, a ‘search
for the best characterization available of what humans are like’ (Dupré 2011: 169–70). On this
account, the expression would simply pick out a descriptive human nature.
5. Explanativism
Explanativist accounts, by contrast, argue for the following: given that there nonetheless is something
that developmentally and evolutionarily explains the human life form, scientists use (and should
use) the expression ‘human nature’ for this explanans (rather than for the descriptive human life
form, the explanandum). Language, for instance, is not only part of human nature, it is also
explanatorily relevant for further features that rely on it, be these traits typical (e.g., morality) or
varying (e.g., speaking Japanese). There are then explanatory relations between the properties
of the cluster forming the pattern of similarities and differences between humans. For
an explanativist, the descriptive human life form contains an explanatory human nature.
One of the best known recent empirical accounts of ‘the way humans are’ is provided by
Michael Tomasello. As he is a psychologist, Tomasello’s preferred level of analysis is that of in-
dividuals, ‘humans’, as he mostly calls his object of study (e.g., in Tomasello 2008). He does not
use the term ‘human nature’ and only very rarely calls humans a species (Tomasello 2008: 344).
Nonetheless, the empirical research in Tomasello’s case does two things: it, ﬁrst, picks out a
descriptive life form, and, second, establishes explanatory relations between the features of the
human life form. The comparative psychological tests that Tomasello et al. (2005) conducted
with humans and other primates revealed a single feature to be distinctive and explanatory for
human social interaction: shared intentionality, i.e., the ability to participate with conspeciﬁcs
in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions, a mutuality that is not only charac-
teristic for but also unique to humans. Connected with and explained by shared intentionality
is a pattern of capacities, psychological dispositions, and motivational states that are equally
characteristic (typical and unique) for humans. Examples would be humans’ characteristic
modes of communication and their cumulative culture that is so obviously unparalleled.© 2014 The Author(s)
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intentionality and its consequent capacities might turn out to be contingently sufﬁcient,
they are clearly not necessary.
In its explanatory role, shared intentionality can be compared to the central function attrib-
uted to reason or language in classical philosophical accounts of human nature. According to
Roughley (2011), traditional claims that such features constitute ‘human nature’ are, once
divested of any deﬁnitional aspirations, best understood as claims that these features are ‘struc-
tural properties of the characteristic human life form’, where the characteristic human life form
itself corresponds to a ﬁrst, weaker concept of human nature. Structural properties are under-
stood as explaining not only why humans typically instantiate particular further features but also
the way in which those features are instantiated. If Tomasello is right about shared intentional-
ity, for instance, shared intentionality can explain both the genesis of language as a system for
intentionally directing attention and the transformation of animal emotions within shared con-
ventional frameworks.
Samuels (2012) is also best understood as defending an explanativism regarding human na-
ture. His aim is to show how human nature is used in cognitive and behavioral sciences. Human
nature is for him ‘a suite of mechanisms that underlie the manifestation of species-typical cog-
nitive and behavioral regularities.’ These mechanisms are themselves regularities (e.g., language
production systems), but regularities that explain surface patterns of similarity and difference
(e.g., similarities and differences in spoken languages).
Walsh (2006), who explicitly embraces the Darwinian challenge, regarding talk about a def-
initional essence as senseless, nevertheless assumes that there are explanatory essences, natures of
individual organisms. These consist in recurrent developmental mechanisms and those capacities
of the organisms of a particular species (such as plasticity) that explain that species’ evolvability.
Kim Sterelny (2012) has developed an approach that is similar in that it also emphasizes
mechanisms he takes to be responsible for evolvability. Although he makes no explicit use of
the term ‘human nature’, his theory works with an explanatory conception that fulﬁlls precisely
the explanatory function of a species’ essence that Walsh speciﬁes. According to Sterelny, there
are unique feedback mechanisms that explain not only the rapid evolutionary divergence
between humans and their close relatives but also why humans are so exceptionally plastic in
their behavior. These mechanisms thus explain the pattern of similarity and differences referred
to by a descriptive concept of human nature. One such feedback mechanism, for instance, con-
nects individual expertise, social learning, and life history. As the relevant mechanisms constitute
a dynamic pattern, Sterelny’s explanatory human nature is not realized in any speciﬁc feature,
but in a purely formal uniqueness of humans. In Sterelny’s words, ‘we are creatures of feedback’
(Sterelny 2012: 75). The speciﬁc evolutionary feedback mechanisms themselves are the
explanatory human nature. They are the theoretical entities that provide the deepest explana-
tion of why humans are the way they are.
6. Taxonomic Relationalism
Okasha (2002) defends a liberal essentialism by dropping the requirement that species’ essences
have to refer to intrinsic properties. Essences remain deﬁnitional, but now have no prominent
explanatory role, at least not for those taxonomic sciences that have the species category as a core
category. Such taxonomic essences consist in relationships between, rather than intrinsic properties of
individuals, e.g., genealogical relationships. For taxonomic relationalists, similarities between
organisms are derivative, i.e., they result from the relations. Thus, if similarity conf licts with
genealogy in our conception of a species’ boundaries, the latter rules. In other words, if an entity
falls short of being similar enough to other individuals of the species, then it can still partake in
the species as long as it is genealogically related to it. Taxonomic relationalists claim to properly© 2014 The Author(s)
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boundaries are drawn between species.
In spite of his prominent espousal of the Darwinian challenge and misgivings about the mis-
use of talk of ‘human nature’ in the social sphere, David Hull (1986) still developed a construc-
tive account, an account that is similar to Okasha’s in its focus on relational properties. For Hull,
the nature (aka essence) of the human kind is nothing but the genealogical relatedness of the
organisms partaking in the kind.
Neither Hull nor Okasha assumes that relational essences offer an explanation for the human
life form, since the genealogical relatedness that exists between humans also exists between
organisms partaking in different species. Thus, the relevant relations cannot explain why the
individuals in the species have the properties they have and why others do not. Therefore, they
don’t (at least they don’t directly) explain the descriptive human nature other scientists, such as
behavioral ecologists or cognitive scientists, might be interested in.
7. Property Cluster Essentialism
Still other authors, most famously Boyd (1999), want to rescue an explanatory role in
combination with a deﬁnitional role of the concept, in spite of the Darwinian challenge.
This is supposed to be achieved with the help of the notion of ‘homeostatic property
clusters’ (HPCs). Boyd maintains the term ‘essence’ by interpreting it liberally, dropping
the second requirement of traditional essences, namely that a deﬁnition requires necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions.
Boyd believes that HPCs are a benign replacement for traditional species’ essences. Species,
he claims, ‘have deﬁning, real essences’ (Boyd 1999: 146). They consist of clusters of typical
properties plus the homeostatic mechanisms that cause the respective properties to cluster and
to be both developmentally and evolutionarily typical and static. Dropping the intrinsicality
requirement of traditional essences, Boyd also argues that these mechanisms can be of various
kinds and either internal or external to the organisms (e.g., developmental mechanisms, inter-
breeding, or the genealogical relationship of the taxonomic relationalists).
Both the deﬁnitional and the explanatory claims of property cluster accounts have been crit-
icized. On the one hand, they have faced the criticism that, by allowing phylogenetically un-
connected populations to be species, they are at odds with the ‘biological assumption that
taxa are ﬁrst and foremost historical entities’ (Ereshefsky and Matthen 2005: 18). It is thus ques-
tionable whether an HPC can fulﬁll the deﬁnitional role traditional essences (even interpreted
liberally) were meant to play. On the other hand, it has also been argued that HPCs are not ex-
planatory in the right sense. First, since many taxa are characterized not only by similarity but
also by ‘stable and persistent differences’ (polymorphisms), property cluster accounts cannot ex-
plain why species members differ in stable ways (Ereshefsky and Matthen 2005: 7). Second, since
homeostatic mechanisms are general rather than species-speciﬁc, an HPC is still not ‘sufﬁcient
to determine the boundaries of the species that it is supposed to deﬁne’ and can thus also not
explain why species differ (Reydon 2009: 729).
For our topic, the most important point concerns Boyd’s claim that HPCs can play both the
deﬁnitional and the explanatory roles of traditional essences. For the account to succeed, it
would need to rebut the objections on both fronts, a task that looks to be daunting at the very
least. Even if Boyd were to be able to respond to the critique of HPCs’ deﬁnitional role, he
would still have to show that the essence (to which they are supposed to belong) can fulﬁll
the above-mentioned explanatory roles. This looks unlikely. Either way, it seems that the
account will have to scale down its ambitions. Its prospects as a post-Darwinian successor to
traditional essentialism that manages to bring together both the epistemic roles essences tradi-
tionally played thus look extremely slim.© 2014 The Author(s)
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HPC account. The result is a concept of an all-inclusive human nature that comprises all the
resources needed to stabilize the development of the patterns of similarity and difference observ-
able in humankind. Human nature, the thing that explains and deﬁnes the human species, is
then a genealogically anchored explanatory essence of gigantic proportions, namely the whole
developmental system of humankind, including the developmental niche (Stotz 2010). Like the
HPC account, this developmental system concept of human nature is an attempt to develop a
concept of human nature that fulﬁlls more than one epistemic role. It is otherwise a very distant
relative of the traditional concept of human nature, since it construes everything involved in and
resulting from human development as part of human nature. It is doubtful whether such an all-
encompassing concept of human nature is of any concrete use for the sciences, that is, for
describing and explaining commonalities or explaining differences within humankind or
between the human and other species.
8. The Pluralistic Solution
One theoretical option that has remained largely untried in recent work on human nature is a
pluralistic approach. According to such a perspective, the term ‘human nature’ has been used for
different things in the world, depending on differing epistemic goals.
Section 2 reviewed the background of recent debates on human nature: traditional
essentialism not only combines deﬁnitional and explanatory roles in its concept of human
nature but also assumes that one and the same thing in the world is playing each of those roles.
Sections 4-7 dealt with recent constructive proposals that accept the Darwinian challenge,
but remain conceptually monistic: they all seem to take it as given that there can be only
one concept of human nature, unsurprisingly, the one they propose themselves. In doing
so, they fail to take account of the fact that different scientiﬁc ﬁelds are in need of different
concepts of human nature, each fulﬁlling an independent epistemic role. Sometimes, an
explanatory but not a classiﬁcatory concept is required (as in the case of Sterelny or
Tomasello); in other contexts, what is needed is a classiﬁcatory concept that has no explanatory
role (as in the case of taxonomy).
Thus, corresponding to the three epistemic roles, three concepts of human nature can be
distinguished. First, there is a classiﬁcatory concept of a deﬁnitional human nature (e.g., referring
to relations between Homo sapiens or perhaps to homeostatic property clusters). This concept
has applications in taxonomic sciences delineating species. Second, ‘human nature’ can refer
to features of the characteristic human life form, whereby ‘human’ can refer to the species Homo
sapiens or to a larger group (e.g.,Homo sapiens as well as Neanderthals or all hominids). If ‘human
nature’ refers to the human life form, then this is a mere descriptive nature that is quite indepen-
dent of any classiﬁcation or explanation of that life form. A variety of disciplines will be in need
of such a descriptive concept of human nature, basically all those that want to simply refer to
humans in general. Third, the characteristics of the human life form can be explained by evo-
lutionary and developmental mechanisms or even by structural features of the human life form
that are explanatory for the other features. If the term ‘human nature’ refers to any of these, we
have an explanatory human nature. Not all, but many important projects in the human sciences
will be in need of such a concept of human nature. (See Roughley (2011) for a similarly plural-
istic partitioning of different concepts of human nature.)
The proposals that we discussed in Sections 3–7 fail to sufﬁciently acknowledge that plural-
istic conclusion. Eliminativists throw out the baby with the bathwater because of the
indefensibility of traditional essentialism. Property cluster accounts want to conjoin what has
irrevocably fallen apart. And descriptive, explanatory, and taxonomic accounts all tend to forget
that other epistemic interests are frequently important in scientiﬁc contexts not in the focus of© 2014 The Author(s)
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thus only human natures in the world picked out by our epistemic needs: for species boundaries,
for generalizations about humans, and for particular kinds of explanations. These do not easily
map onto each other.
To sum up, different scientiﬁc ﬁelds draw on different epistemic roles (deﬁnitional, descrip-
tive, and explanatory). Depending on which epistemic role is given priority in a speciﬁc scien-
tiﬁc ﬁeld, the referent of the term ‘human nature’ is in each case going to be a different kind of
thing. Nevertheless, the term is used and can be used coherently for all of these things. Thus,
what recent debates on human nature beyond traditional essences show is that there is no
one thing in the world that simultaneously and transcontextually fulﬁlls the epistemic roles that
traditional essences were meant to play within sciences.
9. Conclusion and Future Research
The general conclusion we wish to draw is this: despite the Darwinian challenge, the term
‘human nature’ can and should survive within the sciences – pluralistically twisted into distinct
but connected concepts. What we expect and would welcome from future research are con-
vincing and critical case studies on how exactly the concepts of human nature are – explicitly
or implicitly – assigned roles in different scientiﬁc and social contexts. Equally interesting is
how the normative concerns frequently associated with the term (see Section 1) interfere with
the scientiﬁc concerns we have picked out, sincemany normative discussions assume a particular
scientiﬁc concept of human nature. This holds especially for positions according to which
certain features of the human life form are normatively loaded in such a way as to specify the
conditions of human f lourishing.
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